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Foreword: Choosing Among Systems of
Auto Insurance for Personal Injury
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN
I. BACKGROUND
In 1965 Jeffrey O'Connell and Robert Keeton published Basic
Protection for the Traffic Victim. They were hardly the first to advo-
cate what has become known as "no-fault" auto insurance. Yet their
book played a critical role in launching a movement which, during
the decade that followed, saw about half of the states adopt some
sort of no-fault plan.
The auto no-fault movement of the 1960s and 1970s failed in two
important respects, however. First, its political momentum was spent
before the other half of the states fell in line. After ten years of
feverish activity, there followed an equal period of legislative indif-
ference to the issue. Second, most of the states adopted no-fault auto
insurance schemes that are far from ideal in the view of no-fault's
keenest boosters.' In all too many places, no-fault benefits are mea-
ger in amount, and worse, hardly any tort law has actually been dis-
placed. As a consequence, the cost of auto insurance coverage per-
taining to bodily injury is actually higher in several no-fault states
than it would have been under the fault system-a result sharply at
odds with what no-fault promoters promised. In addition, since no
United States jurisdiction has fully replaced tort with no-fault, many
observers believe that first party benefits actually promote litigation;
that is, the availability of a no-fault award now enables claimants to
resist an early and low settlement with their injurer's insurance
company.
1. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO Acci-
DENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES
(1985).
At the same time, no-fault advocates consider the plan a very con-
siderable success in the two states-New York and Michi-
gan-which have gone furthest with the idea. In those states, auto
accident victims are assured reasonably generous and promptly paid
benefits to replace their economic losses without the need to prove or
disprove fault. At the same time, both states use high "verbal"
thresholds to screen from the tort system claims for pain and suffer-
ing by those who have not incurred serious injuries.2 As a result, in
both places the number of personal injury claims for auto accidents
has been drastically reduced, more auto accident victims obtain re-
covery than under the old system, and auto insurance rates with re-
spect to bodily injury are lower than they would have been under the
fault system. In short, in New York and Michigan, no-fault has
worked as its supporters promised, squeezing out of the system legal
costs and noneconomic loss awards in nonserious injury cases and
redirecting that money both to a wider group of victims and back
into the pockets of motorists generally.
In the face of this experience, one might expect fans of no-fault to
redouble their efforts to get existing no-fault states to switch to-and
other states to adopt-plans patterned after New York and Michi-
gan. (Michigan's is more generous in its unlimited coverage of medi-
cal expenses, and Michigan's, uniquely, covers property damage as
well.) Some people have indeed adopted that strategy. As William
George explains in his article that follows, California Assemblyman
Patrick Johnston, chair of the Assembly Finance and Insurance
Committee, with the support of Consumers Union, carried (unsuc-
cessfully) a New York style bill during the 1989 legislative session.3
So, too, Professor Joseph Little's article in this issue calls for what
he labels "more aggressive no-fault"-which is largely the New
York plan.4
Professor O'Connell, however, is now promoting a different strat-
egy-the idea of "choice," which is explained below. His shift in
approach can be explained in several ways. First, O'Connell is prob-
ably pessimistic about the political prospects of a new effort to
achieve mandatory and expansive no-fault.5 Second, he is clearly
somewhat disheartened by the litigation-promoting propensity of the
2. For example, Michigan requires "death, serious impairment of a body function,
or permanent serious disfigurement." Id. at 34.
3. See George, Whither No-Fault in California: Is There Salvation After Proposi-
tion 103?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1065, 1077 (1989). As George explains, later in the
session, Johnston scaled his proposal way back in hopes that its lower price tag for the
motorist would attract greater political support. Id. at 1079.
4. Little, Reducing Noneconomic Damages by Trick, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017,
1024 (1989).
5. George documents California's history of political failure to adopt no-fault
through both legislative and initiative processes. George, supra note 3, at 1067.
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typical combined fault and no-fault systems adopted by most states.
Finally, given the current wave of public unrest over auto insurance
rates, he is understandably eager to offer an alternative that
promises to achieve a sharp reduction in responsible people's auto
insurance costs even beyond what New York has accomplished with
its version of no-fault.
In 1986, O'Connell and Robert Joost advanced an extremely crea-
tive proposal in an article titled "Giving Motorists a Choice Between
Fault and No-Fault Insurance."6 Simply put, motorists would be al-
lowed to make an election that would free them from tort liability
for auto accidents, on the condition that, in return, they give up their
own right to sue in tort for auto accidents. In the O'Connell and
Joost plan, those making the election would not buy auto liability
insurance, but instead would purchase first party protection (i.e., no-
fault). If this choice were fairly priced, O'Connell and Joost believe
that motorists would be able to buy very generous no-fault protection
(broadly covering economic losses but not pain and suffering) for
considerably less than they now pay for an equivalent amount of lia-
bility insurance.
In their proposal, O'Connell and Joost clearly stood behind the
right of individuals to choose. They also argued that the ability of
people to choose the tort option would help force the no-fault insur-
ers to run a fair and efficient system. Yet it should be clear that they
confidently believed that well-informed individuals facing the choice
would overwhelmingly elect the no-fault option. Not only would it be
cheaper, but, by O'Connell and Joost's lights, it would be better.
The genius of the idea from a political perspective is that the pow-
erful opposition of the plaintiffs' bar to no-fault might be an end run
in the quiet of the insurance agent's office. That is, if politicians who
caved in to the trial lawyers' arguments against mandatory no-fault
could give the choice instead to consumers, we might achieve a far-
reaching no-fault plan through the accumulation of individual deci-
sions made outside the state legislature.
In the reasonably short time since the "choice" idea has. been
launched, it has received considerable attention, both favorable and
not, and versions of the plan have been introduced in several state
legislatures. Now O'Connell and Joost are back in this Symposium,
separately this time, responding to some critics, providing new data,
6. O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists A Choice Between Fault and No-Fault
Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986).
filling in some details, and offering some possible modifications that
might make the "choice" idea more attractive in some quarters.'
On the last point they are joined in this Symposium by Professor
Craig Brown, a prot~g6 and sometime co-author of O'Connell, who
argues that we might possibly be politically wiser to put people to a
choice after the accident rather than when they initially buy insur-
ance.8 Although I find Brown's proposal conceptually very different
from the O'Connell and Joost plan, it might function in a reasonably
similar way-with most people choosing no-fault, but this time after
they are injured. Interestingly, Brown's scheme is broadly modeled
after tort reform proposals that O'Connell has been promoting for
some time in the nonauto area.9
The enthusiasm of O'Connell, Joost, and Brown for some kind of
choice mechanism that might move the auto accident problem
largely into a no-fault mode is met in this Symposium by strongly
put objections from Professor Jack Carr'0 and Professor Joseph Lit-
tle, who offer rather different (although partially overlapping)
criticisms.
II. A FEW KEY ISSUES
Both Little and Carr strongly protest, on moral grounds, the whole
idea that people should be permitted to make a choice that frees
them from liability for negligently injuring innocent victims. As Carr
puts it, making a choice that functions to deprive others of their
rights is not, as O'Connell and Joost originally argued by way of
analogy, the same as choosing to drive a car with a manual instead
of an automatic transmission. But this objection seems far too sweep-
7. O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back By Popular (Market) Demand?, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (1989); Joost, Choosing the Best Auto Insurance Choice Sys-
tem, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1033 (1989).
8. Brown, A Choice of Choice: Adding Postaccident Choice to the Menu of No-
Fault Models, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1095 (1989).
9. See, e.g., O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985).
In O'Connell's other proposals there is a risk that many of those with strong tort
claims will not opt for the no-fault alternative, thereby threatening to make the plan
more, rather than less, expensive than the system it replaces. Brown would deal with this
problem by changing the damages rules for those who go the tort route. Most impor-
tantly, by imposing a substantial threshold on recovery for pain and suffering, the bulk of
victims, even with strong tort claims, would not find it beneficial to pursue those claims.
Brown, supra note 8, at 1097.
What is a little awkward about Brown's proposal, however, is that by claiming no-fault
benefits on your own policy, you are thereby barred from suing your injurer. To many, it
will seem quite wrong that by choosing to obtain benefits you have paid for, you forfeit
your right to claim against another. In the O'Connell proposals, by contrast, the injurer
provides the no-fault benefits that you take in lieu of your right to sue.
10. Carr, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An
Economic Critique, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1087 (1989).
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ing. Consider the example of two people who go on a white water
rafting adventure and who mutually and voluntarily agree in ad-
vance that neither will be able to sue if either were accidentally to
injure the other. Or imagine a group of friends making such a deal
before engaging in some recreational activity together, such as play-
ing touch football. Expanding these analogies, it does not seem mor-
ally wrong to me that, even though they do not personally know each
other, all of those who would elect to be in the auto no-fault system
would be mutually barred from suing each other, assuming it were
well understood in advance that this is part of the deal.
The tougher problem arises when X elects to be free from lawsuits
and then negligently injures Y who has made no such election.
Viewed in isolation, this seems no more just than, as Carr analo-
gizes, to allow a polluter unilaterally to elect to be exempt from the
tort system. But the proposal of O'Connell and Joost contains an
additional feature designed to counter this objection. Those who
elect to stay in the tort system would be able to make a fault based
claim for damages after all. At least as a general proposition, they
would be entitled to the same recovery as they are today.
The "catch" is they would have to make that claim against their
own insurer under their own insurance policy-pursuant to what
O'Connell and Joost call "connector" or "inverse liability" insur-
ance, which is essentially the same as the "uninsured and underin-
sured motorist" coverage that motorists typically carry along with
their liability insurance. At first blush, it might seem highly unfair
that victims who have chosen the fault system also have to pay for
"inverse liability" insurance to cover the fault of those who elect the
no-fault option. But, as O'Connell and Joost point out, those electing
the fault system would gain one substantial benefit over the present
system; they would no longer have to pay for liability insurance to
cover cases where they negligently injure those who have made the
no-fault election because the latter would have waived their right to
sue. On this basis, if everything works out as O'Connell and Joost
hope, the extra cost of the "inverse liability" insurance is balanced
by the reduced cost of liability insurance; as a result, those choosing
the fault system would wind up both paying what they should fairly
pay and getting what they were entitled to get per tort law if they
were injured.
Notice here that if more and more people elect the no-fault solu-
tion, those left in the fault system would find that more of their pre-
mium goes for "inverse liability" insurance and less and less for lia-
bility insurance. At the limit, the final person electing the fault
option would pay nothing for his careless driving since there would
be no one left to sue him; instead, his bodily insurance premium
would go entirely to create a fund against which he could collect if
anyone else negligently injures him.
The "fly" in this ointment, if there is one, arises from differences
between the people who would elect fault and those who would elect
no-fault. Both Carr and Professor George Priest, in an unpublished
memorandum mentioned by a number of the authors here,11 predict
that, for reasons suggested in the next paragraphs, the no-fault elec-
tion will be made disproportionately by careless drivers. This adverse
selection might lead to several important negative consequences.
First, if less careful motorists initially opt disproportionately into
the no-fault system, this group presumably would be in a relatively
greater number of accidents and that, in turn, could make the no-
fault option quite expensive as compared with the fault option. This,
in turn, may discourage others from selecting it, particularly the
careful, with a subsequent further exaggeration of the price differen-
tial between the fault and the no-fault groups. This problem might
be reasonably well solved, however, through the way the no-fault in-
surance premiums are set (e.g., by charging more to those involved
in more accidents)-a matter to which O'Connell and Joost, in my
judgment, pay too little attention.
Second, even with differential pricing among those opting for no-
fault, if no further adjustment were made, the fault-selecting group
as a whole might pay more than would be thought fair. Put simply,
if they were more frequently injured by the more careless, no-fault-
selecting drivers than they in turn injure such drivers, the "inverse
liability" insurance purchased by those staying in the tort system
would have to increase in price faster than their liability insurance
could decline in price. This problem might be well solved, however,
through a mandatory cost reallocation agreement among insurers,
pursuant to which charges are made against the no-fault selecting
group and credits given to the fault-selecting group. This could be
accomplished, for example, through a "risk exchange" device of the
sort that Joost here describes New Jersey as having recently
adopted. 12
Third, those selecting the no-fault option might cause more acci-
dents because they have been freed from tort liability. This clearly
undesirable consequence could be badly magnified if the no-fault
plan were eagerly selected by those who have a tendency to be less
11. G. Priest, Allowing Drivers a Choice between No-Fault and Fault-Based Auto
Insurance: An Analytical Critique (Nov. 17, 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
12. Joost, supra note 7, at 1045.
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careful anyway and might thus be especially desirous of escaping
tort sanctions. Whether no-fault would breed more careless conduct
depends upon whether tort liability for bodily injury under the cur-
rent regime actually deters negligent driving. While simple economic
models show that tort law ought to channel conduct in a socially
desirable way, the addition of real world variables (such as criminal
penalties for bad driving, liability insurance, fear for one's own
safety, and moral aversion to careless conduct) makes many people
skeptical about the behavioral impact of tort law in the motoring
arena. Alas, the empirical findings are mixed.' 3
Nonetheless, two recent Canadian studies find that the shift from
fault to no-fault, holding other things constant, does indeed lead to
more accidents. 4 These studies examine the Quebec experience, the
only North American example of a jurisdiction completely substitut-
ing no-fault for fault in the auto accident area."
A critical question about the Quebec experience is how much of
the accident increase is a product of people driving worse because
their tort liability has been removed, and how much of the accident
increase is a result of more people driving. Consider this hypothetical
scenario. In the nation of Econoland, it previously cost $500 to fly
from the city of Coase to the city of Posner, the locations .of the
country's only two airports. Suddenly, Dr. Calabresi invents a new
metal alloy that reduces the cost of airplanes so much that the fare
is reduced to $250. As a result many more people fly than before and
with this increased traffic comes more accidents-not, let us assume,
because more planes in the air means more planes crashing into each
other, but simply because more are downed by bad weather. Would
people then condemn the reduction in the price of air travel because
of the increase in accidents that comes along with it? I doubt it.
With this scenario in mind, I note that Quebec's plan reduced auto
insurance premiums significantly, especially for younger drivers,
who, not surprisingly, substantially increased their driving. It is also
noteworthy that Quebec charges all motorists the same premium;
that is, there are no variations either for past individual driving con-
duct or for predictors of accident involvement such as age and where
the car is driven. Obviously, all those electing the no-fault option in
13. See S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 21-23 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Trebilcock, The Future of Tort Law: Mapping The Contours of the
Debate, 15 CAN. Bus. L.J. 471, 476 nn.8, 9 (1989).
15. See O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law:Quebec's Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987).
the O'Connell and Joost plan need not be charged the same pre-
mium. Experience in the United States with no-fault today suggests
that, if the decision is left to market forces, insurers would differenti-
ate among the insureds. Because of these confounding features of the
Quebec experience, at this time I remain unpersuaded that we would
see the significant decline in careful driving that Carr and others
predict will occur under the O'Connell and Joost plan.
It is also by no means clear that the critics are correct in their
prediction of who would actually elect the no-fault option. O'Connell
and Joost, as I noted, anticipate a high take-up rate by all classes of
drivers. Yet Little, for example, describes himself as a high earning
person who would eagerly remain in the tort system. Since I assume
that his law professor's salary and his potential health care costs are
already well insured apart from any ability to recover in tort, I imag-
ine that what he wants to do is protect his right to collect for pain
and suffering if someone negligently injures him."' In thinking about
whether Little's reaction might be typical or not, it has seemed to
me that I would readily give up my existing right to pain and suffer-
ing damages-provided that sufficient value, by my lights, were pro-
vided in return. Whether that would happen turns on what the
O'Connell and Joost no-fault benefit package would look like, how
expensive it would be, and how optional it wodld be.
In my case, for example, even a reasonably attractive package of
first party auto no-fault benefits (e.g., the New York style which
provides up to $50,000) has only marginal appeal. This is because
my other existing sources of compensation render such a no-fault
package largely duplicative. (Its attraction for other members of my
family is another matter-and another complication.) But, if I could
simply opt out of all no-fault coverage, I could clearly save a consid-
erable sum of money-presumably my entire current auto liability
insurance premium for bodily injury. For that amount of savings, I
would indeed forgo my right to sue for pain and suffering if negli-
gently injured by another driver.
Notice, however, that if I am permitted to make the choice of sim-
ply giving up my right to sue in return for gaining immunity from
suit, I am thereby able to shift what are now generally viewed as
auto accident costs onto my health and disability insurance carriers.
From the self-interested perspective, since those carriers provide
group insurance that I obtain through my employment, I am un-
likely to incur offsetting increases in what I now have to pay for such
16. Joost suggests the possibility of offering an optional first party benefit that
would pay for pain and suffering. Joost, supra note 7, at 1038. It is unclear, however,
whether people like Little are interested in compensation for pain and suffering per se or
only when they have been wronged.
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insurance. 17 From the social perspective, however, some might object
to that sort of cost shifting.
If, in order to keep auto accident costs (or at least some of them)
contained within the auto insurance world, I am forced to purchase,
say, $100,000 of no-fault insurance with no deductible, at roughly
the price of my present liability insurance, then it is possible that
even I, like Little, might prefer to stay with the present system. A
different package, at the same cost, would be much more attractive
to me, however-for example, a much higher maximum no-fault
benefit (say, $2,000,000) combined with a substantial deductible
(say, $25,000) that my other compensation sources would readily
cover. At least then I would be gaining catastrophic injury protection
that I might not now have. Of course, the choice presented to me
might not be set at a cost roughly equal to my current cost. Suppose,
for example, I could buy $100,000 of no-fault insurance at less than
half the cost of my current liability insurance-something
O'Connell's data suggest I might well be able to do. Then, too, the
no-fault option would be quite appealing to me-at least as much for
its cost reduction attributes as for its benefits.
Other people are in radically different situations, and hence their
reactions to alternate options may differ significantly from mine.
Most importantly, many people do not have the other sources of
compensation that I have. Hence they are likely to find a New York
style package of no-fault benefits more attractive than I do. At the
same time, if such people were permitted to opt out of the fault sys-
tem (i.e., for immunity) and then to purchase no first party protec-
tion, the results of their choices might be socially unacceptable. Such
people could achieve substantially lower insurance costs ex ante, but
at the price of no protection if they are involved in an auto crash.
Although O'Connell and Joost wave the banner of "choice," this
does not appear to be a form of choice they are willing to allow
people to make. In other words, before you surrender the right to sue
another, you had better have some protection for yourself. This sort
of paternalism, I note, is reflected today in the frequent judicial in-
17. Of course, if many people were to make this sort of choice, those health and
disability insurers may have to increase their premiums across the board. On the other
hand, these increases in the aggregate are likely to be far less than the aggregate of auto
liability insurance premiums that are saved. This is because of the much lower transac-
tion costs associated with first party insurance as compared with liability insurance com-
bined with first party insurer subrogation (whereby, as under the present system, my
health insurer seeks reimbursement from me for the health care costs it covered once I
obtain compensation for those expenses from my injurer's liability insurer).
validation of pre-accident express agreements not to sue-such as
where tenants or patients waive their right to file negligence actions
against their landlords or hospitals as a condition of service.' 8
O'Connell, Joost, and Little all give considerable attention to the
poor. We know that in many jurisdictions today a significant portion
of the poor are scofflaws when it comes to mandatory auto liability
insurance. To Joost, the main point is that the poor who do buy lia-
bility insurance now really get nothing for it because they would be
judgment proof without it. But by opting for no-fault they would
finally be gaining something-their own protection-for their
money; protection that is often especially needed by them because
too many of their poor neighbors do not carry liability insurance. For
Little, the poor are foolish to buy auto insurance today because of
their practical freedom from personal liability. Hence, for them, the
choice plan portends the possibility of a substantial increase in their
driving costs-assuming that the purchase of first party protection is
mandatory and effectively enforced. Responding to this concern,
O'Connell now appears to be willing to structure the choice proposal
so that those who are otherwise judgment proof (i.e., the poor) could
sensibly contemplate purchasing only $15,000 of first party benefits;
others, however, would be unwise, given the new wrinkles O'Connell
proposes, to buy less than $100,000 of first party benefits.
In my view, given the fault system, it is irresponsible for people to
drive without having liability insurance, a point that O'Connell en-
dorses. Surely, a great number (although plainly not all) of those
now driving without liability insurance could actually afford what is
legally required if they were willing to drive older or less fancy
automobiles. Hence, I do not consider it socially disadvantageous for
a reform to impose new costs on people who are acting irresponsibly.
(That general governmental assistance to the poor is currently inade-
quate is, of course, a problem, but, I believe, a separate one.)
The American practice of not seriously enforcing financial respon-
sibility laws in the auto insurance area and only requiring puny
amounts of coverage in the first place (typically $15,000 or $20,000
per person and $30,000 or $40,000 per accident) is also responsible
for many pressures on substantive tort doctrine that some find dis-
torting. It leads to the search for a deep pocket plausibly connected
to an auto accident because the driver who is clearly at fault cannot
fully compensate the victim. This search has prompted efforts to
hold others legally responsible for accidents caused by careless driv-
ers-including those who serve alcohol to drivers, those who design
18. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Matin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465,
143 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1978); Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383
P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
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and mark highways, those who loan their cars to drivers (or leave
their keys in them for the taking), those who repair cars, and those
who manufacture them. Of course, there would be considerable pres-
sure on many of these other defendants anyway today-both through
partial indemnity suits and in cases where the victim is a driver who
is related to the deep pocket defendant (rather than, as in my para-
digm, a third party who has been hit by an inadequately insured
driver). Nevertheless, the pressures on tort doctrine would be differ-
ent, with the result that the shape of current doctrine could well be
different.
Furthermore, I believe that the typical American financial respon-
sibility law has the required coverage backwards. To the extent they
work at all, these laws only assure that the slightly or modestly in-
jured victim is protected. This means that someone seriously injured
by a private individual in an auto accident will, much of the time, be
grossly undercompensated by auto liability insurance. I would find it
far better to require people, for the same cost, to buy liability insur-
ance with a higher ceiling and a substantial deductible; that is, I
would prefer to see the less injured victim stuck with a judgment
proof defendant (within the zone of the deductible) if, in return, the
more seriously injured victim were more fully compensated. By con-
trast, it has been my experience in Western Europe that no such
choice is necessary. When one purchases liability insurance, one is
protected to the full extent of one's liability.
Of course, requiring all motorists in America to buy unlimited lia-
bility insurance (and seriously enforcing the requirement) would
mean a substantial increase in auto insurance costs for most people
at a time when policy analysts and politicians are desperately look-
ing for something that will reduce those costs. In my judgment, the
main reason auto liability insurance costs for bodily injury are so
high in the United States is that we are so liberal in the award of
pain and suffering damages, for both small and large injury cases.
For the seriously injured auto victim, the bitter irony in America, as
compared with other countries, is that while there is some chance
you will be extremely generously compensated by the driver who
negligently harms you, there is a greater chance you will hardly be
compensated at all because your injurer has purchased only the min-
imum liability insurance required by law.
III. A DIFFERENT IDEA
If a main goal today, as several of the authors in this Symposium
emphasize, is to reduce auto insurance costs, how about a plan that
eliminates auto liability insurance premiums entirely? Consider this
proposal.
Motorists could no longer be sued in tort-thus obviating the need
for liability insurance. 19 As a corollary, of course, nor could they, as
victims, sue other motorists. So far, it would be as though everyone
made the initial election that O'Connell and Joost favor. But that
election would not require the mandatory purchase of any auto no-
fault insurance.
What about compensating victims, then? And what about inter-
nalizing auto accident costs to motoring? And what about, to the
extent one can, deterring careless drivers (or at least penalizing
them)?
I propose that the state assure the universal availability of first
party (no-fault) benefits for auto accident victims, but that these
benefits not be funded through no-fault auto insurance. Instead,
there would be three new funding sources, and for the present it is
probably sensible to assume that each would contribute one-third of
the plan's revenues.
One funding source would be an increase in the gasoline tax.20
This, generally speaking, would impose costs on those who drive
more, and hence, other things being equal, are more likely to be in
accidents. This effect would appeal to both fairness and cost inter-
nalizing norms. This mechanism would also favor cars with greater
fuel efficiency, something that would probably be supported by the
public at large on environmental grounds and on grounds it would
promote freedom from economic dependence on other nations. To be
sure, the more fuel efficient cars tend to be lighter, and lighter cars
in turn tend to cause more damage to their occupants when they are
in accidents. Yet there seems to be no strong public support for a
policy that would favor cost relief for drivers of heavier cars, if for
no other reason than that their cars, while perhaps safer to occu-
pants, seem also to cause more harm to others.
The second funding source would be annual driver's license fees.
These fees would not only be considerably higher on average than
today, but also they could be adjusted based upon various factors
19. I put aside the problem of intentional torts committed with automobiles, as
well as the question of whether special treatment should be reserved for alcohol and drug
impaired drivers.
20. For another proposal to fund no-fault benefits with gasoline taxes, see, e.g., A.
TOBIAS, INVISIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEVER WANTED
TO KNOW (1982); Tobias, Fill 'Er Up With No-Fault, Please, TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at
52.
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about the driver that are thought relevant and fair. For example, the
annual fee could be set sharply higher for younger drivers (or for the
broader class of newer drivers). Adjustments could also be made for
the driver's place of residence, such as for those living in counties
with high accident rates. Additionally, surcharges could be imposed
based upon certain past driving conduct-such as having so many
traffic citations of a certain sort, or such as having been involved in
so many auto accidents of a certain sort. Of course, in the details of
these adjustments there are difficult issues and the promise of con-
siderable controversy. But I leave those details for another time. The
main point is that this part of the funding mechanism can be used,
to the extent politically agreeable, to promote deterrence and fair
cost-sharing goals at the individual level--or at least to give sym-
bolic recognition to those goals.
The final funding source would be a tax on new car sales. At the
outset this tax should probably be set on a per car basis. But after a
reasonable phase in period, the tax could be adjusted depending
upon the accident involvement history of that model (or, perhaps, the
several models sold by the manufacturer through separate dealers).
The idea of imposing a tax on car makers that varies based upon a
model's accident involvement record was first suggested to me by
Professor Howard Latin.2 This strategy, simply put, is primarily
meant to give manufacturers financial rewards for making safer cars
and secondarily to internalize costs differentially among buyers when
the autos they purchase have different accident exp6rience rates. Al-
though these differential charges might only serve symbolic func-
tions, their chances of influencing manufacturer and consumer con-
duct could be increased if price stickers posted on new cars were
required to disclose the auto accident tax assigned to the particular
model. (Of course, the car itself only partly contributes to its in-
volvement in an accident; yet, under my proposal, car taxes only con-
tribute one-third of the revenues to the plan.)
One important advantage of this three part funding method is that
it would be difficult for people to evade. Driving license fees would
probably be more effectively enforced than are financial responsibil-
ity laws today. Gasoline taxes would be very difficult to escape, as
would the tax on new car sales (except, of course, by infrequently
entering the new car market).
These three types of revenues would be collected by a state agency
21. See generally Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liabil-
ity, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 677 (1985).
with which auto accident victims would file benefit claims on a no-
fault basis. The structure of the benefits would, of course, determine
the level of funding required. For now, I propose the following. For
those auto accident victims suffering disabilities lasting less than six
months and who have no permanent and significant impairment or
disfigurement, the agency would pay for reasonably incurred, and
otherwise uncompensated, expenses for medical care, rehabilitation,
and the like, plus eighty-five percent of otherwise uncompensated in-
come losses up to twice the state average weekly wage.
For those whose injuries are more serious (an estimated ten per-
cent of all bodily injury cases), additional benefits would include
compensation for lost earning power to those not now in the paid
work force, and perhaps even the payment of moderate sums for
pain and suffering along the lines now provided in New Zealand pur-
suant to its general accident compensation scheme.22
It is important to appreciate that, since the benefits payable to
auto victims under my proposal would only supplement other com-
pensation sources, the more employee benefit and social insurance
plans grow, the less the motoring related no-fault benefits would be
claimed and so, other things being equal, less money would be
needed from the three revenue sources. Moreover, since employee
benefit and social insurance plans tend to be more effective in cover-
ing medical expenses and income losses associated with short term
disabilities, my proposed method of benefit coordination would tend
to concentrate auto related benefits on the most seriously injured."
Indeed, it is arguable that the auto related benefits under my propo-
sal should, in any event, be restricted to the seriously injured on the
ground that if society is, in effect, going to paternalize motorists by
creating a mandatory compensation fund, it should concentrate that
fund on the more catastrophic risks which people tend systematically
to ignore and which are the most socially disruptive if left
uncompensated.
I believe the package of benefits I have outlined would cost consid-
22. New Zealand currently awards up to $27,000 for permanent impairment or
significant pain as a result of an accident. For a discussion of this part of the New Zea-
land scheme in operation and recommendations for reform, see LAW COMISSION, PER-
SONAL INJURY: PREVENTION AND RECOVERY, REPORT No. 4 (1988) (New Zealand).
23. Making the auto accident benefit plan "secondary" to other sources of compen-
sation admittedly gives up on the broad goal of using carefully calculated accident cost
internalization in support of the efficient allocation of resources at the activity level. But
since, for example, import quotas on Japanese cars already artificially increase auto
prices and thus currently distort the motoring market, there is little reason to believe that
shifting some auto accident costs to health and disability insurance would make things
worse. As for the potential "act" level influences of the three part funding plan (on the
manner of driving and the design of new cars), there would still be considerable room for
differential charging even after some auto accident costs are shifted to other sources of
compensation.
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erably less than is now collected in the aggregate for auto liability
insurance for bodily injury. To be sure, many more victims would be
covered than now are covered in fault-only states. And I concede
that there might well be some inefficiency arising from monopolistic
public administration of my proposal. But, on the other hand, there
would be enormous cost savings.
These economies would include saved commissions for brokers and
agents, sharply reduced advertising and other marketing costs now
incurred by insurers, and the end of insurer profits.24 The lion's share
of claims administration expenses would also be eliminated-most
importantly from the near eradication of legal fees on both sides.
Double recovery would cease as well (and the administrative costs of
subrogation would be saved where there is subrogation by health in-
surers and other collateral sources today). Finally, the payment of
money for pain and suffering would decline considerably-both in
the smaller injury cases where it would be abolished, and in the
larger injury cases where it would be reduced, perhaps primarily by
the elimination of the occasional million dollar plus jackpot award.
In fact, although some seriously injured auto victims would, of
course, get far less money than they do today from the tort system,
many others would actually secure larger recoveries because they
would not be up against an uninsured or underinsured defendant.
Under my proposal, insurers might still perform claims processing
functions under contract with the state agency in the same way that
private insurers now process Medicare claims for the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, to promote effective competition in claims processing
that serves the needs of both claimants and the state, certain ar-
rangements could be worked out that would allow people to choose
in advance which insurer would process their claim in the event of a
subsequent injury.
If we as a society were offered this proposal, I think a well-in-
formed public would prefer it to the current system, to New York or
to Michigan no-fault plans (where the seriously injured still have to
sue for full economic loss recovery and where costly insurance mar-
keting still exists), or to the O'Connell and Joost plan. But achieving
the legislative adoption of such a proposal promises to be rather diffi-
24. If my proposal were combined with the adoption of a no-fault approach to
automobile property damage (something Michigan has already done), then it would
make sense for people to obtain their remaining auto related insurance as part of their
homeowner's (or renter's) insurance instead of through a separate auto policy as they do
today.
cult in the face of the political might of the trial lawyers who want
to keep the tort system, the auto insurers who want to hold on to the
bodily injury insurance business (at least if it can be stabilized), and
politicians who are reluctant to raise taxes.
Perhaps, in the end, the O'Connell and Joost choice plan could
turn out to be the best route to the adoption of my proposal. If it
works as they predict, eliminating most lawsuits between motorists,
that would leave the trial lawyers with little investment in maintain-
ing the status quo. Moreover, if nearly all people switch to no-fault,
the need for competing private insurers to market the product is
sharply reduced. Besides, at that point the route to yet further cuts
in auto insurance costs could be seen to lie most promisingly in a
shift to my plan. Of course, motorists as a class would still pay for
their benefits-albeit through new mechanisms-but the net annual
cost reduction for the average driver could be enough to garner the
support of our elected leaders.
Whether my proposal would be feasible and popular remains to be
determined. But it at least demonstrates the point that even if an
individual choice mechanism is superior to the way we presently
treat auto accident compensation, there may be a still superior col-
lective choice alternative.
